






During the last twenty years, Western Europe has
been characterised by both high unemployment and
low growth as compared to the United States.
However, in the last decade, experiences have been
diverse among European countries. Several smaller
countries have managed to reduce unemployment
substantially,whereas the large EU countries (France,
Germany, Italy and Spain) have been less successful
(see Chapters 1 and 2). As discussed at length in last
year’s EEAG report (EEAG 2003), Germany is the
EU country that has suffered the worst stagnation.
Macroeconomic performance is intimately associ-
ated with the functioning of pay setting.It influences
output and employment in a number of ways:
• Aggregate real wage moderation,as was achieved
in, for example, the Netherlands in the 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s, is a precondition for
high equilibrium levels of output and employ-
ment,that is for high average output and employ-
ment over the business cycle.
• Aggregate wage flexibility contributes to output
and employment stabilisation in the case of
macroeconomic shocks. Such flexibility has
become even more important than before with
the common currency,as changes in relative wage
costs represent the only way of changing real
exchange rates among countries in the euro area.
• Relative-wage flexibility is required to reduce
labour market imbalances at sectoral,occupational,
and regional levels that otherwise raise equilibrium
unemployment. Vivid illustrations of the impor-
tance of this factor are provided by eastern
Germany and southern Italy, where a compression
of the wage differentials to the other parts of the
countries is a major cause of high unemployment.
• Pay differentials according to skills determine the
returns to investment in education and training
and thus the pace of human capital accumulation,
which is a fundamental determinant of the rate of
long-run growth.
• The extent to which pay is linked to individual or
group performance at the level of the enterprise
and the workplace has an important influence on
labour productivity.
As discussed in Chapter 2, pay setting and macro-
economic performance are affected by a number of
basic “institutional” factors: the generosity of unem-
ployment insurance, the scope and design of active
labour market policy,the degree of employment pro-
tection, the extent of competition in product mar-
kets,and tax levels (see also Nickell and Layard 1999
and Calmfors and Holmlund 2000).The way pay bar-
gaining is conducted is also a fundamental determi-
nant of macroeconomic performance. This chapter
assesses the on-going developments of pay-setting
systems in the European countries, including the
new EU member states, and gives recommendations
on appropriate reforms.
The chapter is structured in the following way.
Section 1 reviews the present pay-setting practices in
the European countries. Section 2 analyses the
advantages and disadvantages of various systems.
Section 3 discusses possible future developments.
Section 4 offers some normative conclusions as to
what pay-setting systems to strive for.
1. A review of pay-setting systems in Europe
The most striking observation on pay-setting sys-
tems in Europe is probably their diversity and the
number of country-specific features. There is no
such thing as a uniform European model of wage
setting.Still most countries show many similarities.
To characterise pay setting, we focus below on two
key aspects. The first is the importance of collec-
tive bargaining and trade unions. The second
aspect concerns the level at which collective bar-
gaining occurs (the degree of centralisation) and
the extent of co-ordination among various bar-
gaining units.1.1 Unionisation and the coverage of collective
agreements
A key common feature in most western European
countries is the importance of collective agreements.
As shown in Table 3.1, collective agreements cover
over 60 percent of all employees in most of the cur-
rent EU countries, and in some of them (Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Nether-
lands, Spain, and Sweden) coverage is even above
75 percent. In most cases, coverage is higher in the
total economy than in the market sector.This reflects
the fact that collective agreements usually cover a
larger fraction of the labour force in the public than
in the private sector.
The coverage rates of collective agreements are much
more similar among the current EU countries than
unionisation rates. The latter vary from only 10 to
15 percent in France and Spain to 70 to 90 percent in
Belgium and the Scandinavian countries.The similar-
ity of coverage rates, despite the large differences in
union density, can be explained by various extension
mechanisms:in some countries employers choose vol-
untarily to extend collective agreements to all
employees. In others they are legally required to do
so. Most present EU countries –
though not the Scandinavian
ones – also have legal provisions
for extending sectoral collective
agreements to non-unionised
firms in the sector (Ebbinghaus
and Visser 2000; Calmfors et al.
2001).
The main outlier in Western
Europe in terms of coverage of
collective agreements is the
United Kingdom, where the
overall coverage rate in 2001
was estimated at 36 percent.
This reflects a process where
coverage has fallen pari passu
with unionisation over the last
twenty years. According to
Brown et al.(2000),around half
of all employees and around 2/3
of employees in the private sec-
tor now have their wages set
unilaterally by employers in the
United Kingdom. The develop-
ment in New Zealand, and also
in Australia, has been similar to
that in the United Kingdom:
both coverage of collective
agreements and unionisation
have fallen dramatically, al-
though the development in
these countries occurred main-
ly in the 1990s. For New
Zealand, Bray and Walsh
(1998) reported that in the mid-
1990s around 50 percent of all
employment contracts were
between an individual employ-
ee and an employer.The devel-




Coverage of collective agreements and unionisation
a)





Old EU member states
     Austria 98 40 97 34
     Belgium 100 69 82 44
     Denmark 85 88 52 68
     Finland 90 79 67 65
     France 90 9 75 < 4
     Germany 67 30 80 25
     Greece 32
     Ireland 43
     Italy 35 36
     Luxemburg 60 50
     Netherlands 78 27 79 19
     Portugal 62 30 80 < 20
     Spain 81 15 67 < 15
     Sweden 94 79 72 77
     UK
b) 36 29 35 19
New EU member states
     Cyprus 65-70 70
     Czech Republic 25-30 30
     Estonia 29 15
     Hungary 34 20
     Latvia < 20 30
     Lithuania 10-15 15
     Malta 60-70 65
     Poland 40 15
     Slovakia 48 40
     Slovenia 100 41
Other countries
     Australia 22 (23)
c) 23
     Canada 32 30
g)
     Japan 21 22
h) 21 24
     New Zealand 45
d) 22
     Norway 70-77
e) 55
h) 62 44
     Switzerland 53
f) 23
h) 50 22
     US 15 14
h) 13 10
Notes:
a) Coverage refers to the percentage of employees covered by collective
agreements and unionisation to the percentage of employees with union mem-
bership;
b)Figures do not include Northern Ireland; 
c)The parenthesis refers to






Sources: Industrial Relations in the EU Member States and Candidate Countries (2002)
for the total economy and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) for the market sector in most
cases. The sources for the total-economy coverage data are Aus-tralian Workplace
(2003) for Australia, http://www.gov.nf.ca/labour/unionization_rates (2002) for Canada,
Industrial Rela-tions in the EU, Japan and the US (2002) for Japan and the US, Bray and
Walsh (1998) for New Zealand, http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2002/12/study/tn0212102s
for Norway, and Ochel  (2001) for Switzerland. The sources for total-economy
unionisation data are Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) for Japan, Norway, and the US,
OECD for Canada and Switzerland, and ERA (2003) for New Zealand. Differences
among countries should be taken only as broadly indicative, as data are not always
exactly comparable.EEAG Report 63
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dom, New Zealand and Australia imply that the
industrial relations systems there have approached
the US system. In most Western European coun-
tries, except the United Kingdom, coverage rates
have remained quite stable, even though there
have been significant reductions in unionisation
rates in most of them over the last two decades
(the exceptions are the Scandinavian countries and
Belgium; see Ebbinghaus and Visser 2000,
Calmfors et al. 2001, and Ochel 2001).A summary
picture of these reductions is given in Figure 3.1,
which shows how average union density in Western
Europe declined from 44 percent in 1979 to 32 per-
cent in 1998.
It is evident from Table 3.1 that the new EU member
states are very different from the present ones in
terms of both coverage of collective agreements and
unionisation. With the exception of Slovenia (with
almost 100 percent coverage), Cyprus and Malta,
coverage is much lower than in Western Europe.
Unionisation rates are also very low in some of the
new member states. In Estonia, Lithuania, Poland
and Hungary union density is around 20 percent or
lower.This reflects to a large extent the difficulties of
the old trade unions in these countries,which did not
play a wage-bargaining role under communism, to
adapt and obtain legitimacy with employees as well
as the difficulties of building up new unions
(Flanagan 1998).
1.2 Bargaining levels
Table 3.2 gives a summary picture of how collective
bargaining is conducted in different countries.Again
there are large differences
among countries, to a large
extent along the same lines as
the differences in the coverage
of collective agreements. In the
present EU countries, the most
important bargaining level is
usually the sectoral one. This
applies to Austria, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands,Portugal,Spain and
Sweden. In several of these
countries (primarily Austria,
Denmark, Germany and Swe-
den),there is a strong element of
pattern bargaining, with the
engineering sector usually acting
as a wage leader,setting the pace
for the whole economy.
The standard situation in the present EU member
states is one of multi-level (or at least two-tier) col-
lective bargaining, where multi-employer bargaining
at the sectoral level is complemented to a smaller or
larger extent by bargaining at the enterprise level on
the implementation of the sectoral agreements. The
general trend over the last twenty years has been
that the scope for local bargaining has increased
(Traxler et al. 2001; Calmfors et al. 2001; Traxler
2003).This picture is confirmed by the development
of various measures of bargaining co-ordination that
seek to measure the importance of the different bar-
gaining levels (see also Section 2.1). According to
Visser (2000),co-ordination decreased from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1990s in ten out of thirteen EU
countries examined.1 A similar picture is given by
Ochel (2000), who found that co-ordination de-
creased in eight out of thirteen EU countries
between 1975–79 and 1995–99.2
However, the only current EU country where single-
employer bargaining at the local level has become
completely dominating is the United Kingdom,where
multi-employer bargaining at the sectoral level has
almost ceased to exist (Brown et al. 2000; Nickell and
Figure 3.1
1 The ten countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
According to Visser, co-ordination increased in Ireland, the
Netherlands and Portugal. Outside the EU, co-ordination was
found to have decreased in Switzerland but to have remained sta-
ble in Norway.
2 Concerning the EU countries, the difference between Visser and
Ochel is that the latter found bargaining co-ordination to have
decreased in Portugal,increased in Finland and Italy and remained
unchanged in Germany. As to countries outside the EU, Ochel
reports a decrease in co-ordination in Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Norway and Switzerland and unchanged co-ordination in
Japan and the United States.Quintini 2002). Again, similar developments have
occurred in New Zealand and Australia, where the
earlier systems of letting government tribunals deter-
mine sector, and occupation-based national wage
awards were replaced in the 1990s by a system of basi-
cally single-employer bargaining (Honeybone 1997;
Bray and Walsh 1998). France is also a country where
the enterprise is the most important bargaining level
(in recent years stimulated by government financial
incentives for firms to conclude local collective agree-
ments on working time reductions),although bargain-
ing at the enterprise level coexists with bargaining at
the sectoral level (Jefferys 2000; Dufour 2003;
Eironline France 2003).
The enterprise is the dominating bargaining level in
most of the new EU member states (the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Latvia
and Lithuania). The sectoral level is dominating in
Cyprus and of substantial importance in the Slovak
Republic and Slovenia. One important explanation
of the limited role of sectoral bargaining in the for-
mer communist countries is that it has proved diffi-
cult to organise employers’ associations in a situa-
tion of rapid structural change, where many old
(state) firms have been closed down or privatised
and many new firms have been started (Flanagan
1998).
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the trend towards
greater importance of the local bargaining level has
in many of the current EU countries occurred at the
same time as there have been social pacts between












Old EU member states
     Austria Pattern bargaining XXX X
     Belgium Centrally agreed guidelines for wage increases with
the government 2003–04
XXX X X
     Denmark Pattern bargaining XX XX X
     Finland Tripartite national pay agreement 2003–04 XXX XX X
     France XX X
     Germany Pattern bargaining XXX X
     Greece National general collective agreement 2002–03 XX XXX X
     Ireland Tripartite national pay agreement 2003–04 XXX X X
     Italy Social pacts with government 1993 and 1998 setting
guidelines for the wage-bargaining process
XX X
     Luxemburg XX XX
     Netherlands Centrally agreed ceiling for wage increases with
government 2003; tripartite national wage freeze
2004–05
XX XXX X
     Portugal XXX X
     Spain Centrally agreed guidelines for wage increases 2003 XX XXX X
     Sweden Intersectoral agreements setting guidelines for the
wage-bargaining process; pattern bargaining
XXX XX
     UK X XXX
New EU member states
     Cyprus XXX X
     Czech Republic Tripartite national agreements on minimum wages X XXX
     Estonia Tripartite national agreements on minimum wages X XXX
     Hungary National guidelines for wage increases agreed with
government and tripartite national agreements on
minimum wages
X XX XXX
     Latvia Tripartite national agreements on minimum wages X X XXX
     Lithuania X XXX
     Malta XXX
     Poland National guidelines for wage increases agreed with
government and tripartite national agreements on
minimum wages
X XXX
     Slovakia Tripartite national agreements on minimum wages XX X
     Slovenia Tripartite national pay bargains XXX XX X
Other countries
     Australia National wage awards for minimum wages X XX XXX
     Japan Pattern bargaining XXX
     New Zealand X XXX
     Norway Pattern bargaining; tripartite agreement on
guidelines for wage increases 2003
XX XXX X
     Switzerland XX X
     US XXX
Notes: XXX = dominating level
       XX  = important, but not dominating, level
          X  = existing level
Sources: Industrial Relations in the EU Member States and Candidate Countries (2002), Collective Bargaining Coverage and
Extension Procedures (2002), individual Eiroline country reports. For New Zealand: Bray and Walsh (1998).EEAG Report 65
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times also involving the government as a third actor,
setting national norms for pay increases to be nego-
tiated at the sectoral level. Indeed, such agreements
became more frequent in the pre-EMU period in the
1990s as a means to promote real wage restraint
without resorting to inflation and exchange rate
depreciations. Such income policies have also been
used frequently in some EMU countries after 1999
as a means to restrain wage increases.3Table 3.2 also
gives an overview of the extent to which such
attempts at co-ordination of wage increases have
been made recently.
The most comprehensive central agreements in
force are probably those in Finland and Ireland,
where the peak-level labour market organisations
agreed low wage increases with the government for
2003–04 in exchange for tax cuts (Finland) or other
changes in government policies (Ireland). Tripartite
bargaining has also taken place in the Netherlands.
For 2003,the peak-level labour market organisations
agreed on a ceiling for wage increases in exchange
for cuts in taxes and social insurance contributions
(Eironline Netherlands 2002) and for 2004–05 they
accepted a pay freeze in exchange for a government
commitment to refrain from reductions of certain
expenditures. Another recent example of tripartite
bargaining is Belgium, where a central “indicative
norm” on wage increases was negotiated for
2003–04, at the same time as the government under-
took to implement certain employment measures.4
National central agreements on wage increases have
also been negotiated between peak-level employer
organisations and union confederations in Greece
and Spain. Italy and Sweden provide examples of
weaker co-ordination efforts, where earlier social
accords (Italy) or inter-sectoral agreements
(Sweden) established guiding principles for wage
setting and bargaining procedures.5 Germany pro-
vides an exception to the pattern described, as the
attempts there of achieving co-ordinated wage
restraint through social pacts (Bündnis für Arbeit)
have been largely unsuccessful.
Social pacts have also played a much smaller role in
the new EU countries than in the old ones. Slovenia
is the only new member country where tripartite
national pay bargains have a dominating influence,
whereas national guidelines agreed centrally with
the government play some role in Hungary and
Poland.In the other ex-socialist countries joining the
EU,tripartite bargaining at the national level applies
only to minimum wages.
2. Advantages and disadvantages of various 
pay-setting systems
There is a large literature on the advantages and dis-
advantages of various pay-setting systems.This liter-
ature has emphasised the effects on:
• the aggregate (equilibrium) wage and employ-
ment levels
• the flexibility of the aggregate wage level
• relative wages and wage dispersion
• incentives for effort and productivity
2.1 The aggregate wage and employment levels
Much of the literature on pay-setting systems has
focused on the determination of the aggregate wage
level. This literature has usually tried to distinguish
between, on the one hand, the effects of collective
bargaining and unionisation per se, and,on the other
hand, the effects of different degrees of co-ordina-
tion/centralisation of the collective bargaining that
takes place.
Theoretical modelling of trade union behaviour usu-
ally assumes that unions strive for real wages that
trade off the benefits of a wage increase for
employed members against the income (and utility)
loss of those members who may become unem-
ployed because of the wage rise. The bargaining
process between unions and employers is modelled
as providing a negotiated wage that balances unions’
wage objectives against employers’ interests in high
profits (see,for example,Nickell and Layard 1999 or
Calmfors and Holmlund 2000). A well-known argu-
ment based on such an analytical framework is that
a high degree of co-ordination of collective wage
bargaining (which may come about either because
3 See, for example, Crouch (2000a, b), Calmfors et al. (2001), and
Calmfors (2001) for more detailed discussions.
4 The Competition Act of 1996 stipulates formally that wage bar-
gaining must be based on a pay norm set by the Central Economic
Council (an advisory body to the government) according to which
wages should not rise any faster than in Belgium’s three main
neighbouring countries (France, German and the Netherlands)
(Calmfors et al. 2001; Eironline Belgium 2003).
5 In Italy, social accords of 1993 and 1998 established a two-tier
wage-bargaining process, according to which wage increases at the
sectoral level should be linked to forecast inflation, whereas bar-
gaining at the enterprise level should be based on productivity
increases (Baccaro et al. 2002; Bertola and Garibaldi 2003). In
Sweden, an agreement between a number of industry unions and
employers’ associations in 1997 (the Industrial Agreement) has
sought to establish a bargaining framework conducive to industrial
peace and wage moderation with the aim of strengthening the role
of the manufacturing sector as wage leader (Elvander 1999).
Similar agreements on the bargaining framework have later been
concluded in the public sector.bargaining is formally conducted at a high level,such
as the national one, or because separate bargaining
units co-ordinate their actions at that level) pro-
motes real wage restraint because it allows negative
externalities of high wage levels for individual bar-
gaining areas to be internalised. Wage setters will
take into account that high wages for one group may
have a negative impact on other groups. This could
occur for several reasons (Calmfors, 1993):
• because the aggregate consumer price level is
pushed up;
• because the prices of inputs to other production
sectors are increased;
• because high wages in one sector cause job
losses there that reduce employment opportu-
nities for everyone in the economy;
• because such job losses raise costs of unemploy-
ment benefits and reduce the tax base; or 
• because high wages for one group can give rise to
pure envy effects.
For these reasons, one should expect collective bar-
gaining at the sectoral level to result in higher real
wage levels, and thus also higher unemployment,
than co-ordinated multi-sector bargaining, as nega-
tive externalities will be internalised to a lesser
extent. This hypothesis receives strong empirical
support from attempts to relate unemployment dif-
ferences among countries to differences in labour-
market institutions, as is illustrated in Table 3.3 (see
also Calmfors et al. 2001 and Calmfors 2001).6
It has been more difficult to show in time series wage
equations for individual countries that periods with
highly co-ordinated collective bargaining have been
associated with wage moderation (see, for example,
Hartog 1999 on the Netherlands or Walsh 2002 on
Ireland), although Koskela and Uusitalo (2003)
– after controlling for other factors – report signifi-
cantly lower wage increases in Finland in years with
centralised wage agreements than in years when the
main locus of bargaining has been the sectoral level.
It is less clear, both theoretically and empirically,
how decentralised single-employer collective bar-
gaining at the enterprise level compares with multi-
employer bargaining at the sectoral level. If various
degrees of internalisation of negative externalities
were the whole story, then enterprise-level bargain-
ing would imply an even higher aggregate wage level




Unemployment rates under various bargaining regimes (ceteris–paribus differences to decentralised systems)
in various studies
a)
A: Studies finding a hump-shaped relationship between bargaining co-ordination and unemployment
Study Intermediate
co-ordination
High co-ordination Measure of bargaining structure
b)
1 Zetterberg (1995)
c) 2.6 - 1.5 Centralisation
2 Bleaney (1996)
d) 3.5 - 2.1 Centralisation/
co-ordination
3 Scarpetta (1996)
e) 0.9 - 12.0 Centralisation
4 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
f) 1.3 - 2.4 Centralisation
5 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
g) 1.2 - 4.4 Centralisation/
co-ordination
6 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
h) 6.9 - 4.6 Co-ordination
7 Cukierman & Lippi (1999)
i) 5.8   3.2 Centralisation
8 Daveri & Tabellini (2000)
j) 5.8 - 7.2 Geographical
k)
9 Nicoletti et al. (2001)
 l) 3.6 - 2.2 Centralisation/
co-ordination
Average 3.5 - 3.9





Measure of bargaining structure
b)
1 Layard et al. (1991) - 4.7 - 10.4 Co-ordination
2 Zetterberg (1995)
m) - 0.4 - 2.4 Centralisation
3 Scarpetta (1996)
n) - 6.2 - 12.3 Co-ordination
4 Bleaney (1996)
o) - 2.0 - 3.9 Co-ordination
5 Elmeskov et al. (1998)
p) - 0.8 - 5.7 Co-ordination
6 Hall & Franzese (1998)
 q) - 2.6 - 5.1 Co-ordination
7 Iversen (1998)
r) - 3.3 - 4.1 Centralisation
8 Nickell & Layard (1999)
s) - 4.6 - 6.0 Co-ordination
9 Blanchard & Wolfers (2000)
t) - 4.4 - 8.9 Centralisation
10 Belot & van Ours (2001)
u) - 2.6 (0) - 5.2 (0) Co-ordination
11 Belot & van Ours (2001)
 v) - 1.9 - 1.9 Co-ordination
12 Nickell et al. (2003)
x) - 7.2 - 14.4 Co-ordination
Average - 3.4 - 6.7
6 Some of the earlier studies in the table exploit only cross-section
variation among countries, but later studies use panel data, thus
exploiting also time-series variation.EEAG Report 67
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internalisation is lower. In this case there is thus a
monotonic negative relationship between, on the
one hand, the degree of co-ordination and, on the
other hand, the real wage and unemployment
(curve I in Figure 3.2). But enterprise-level bargain-
ing may also have a wage-restraining effect because
it increases competitive pressures to restrain wages.
These pressures may be weak in sectoral bargaining,
since all domestic competitors in a sector are then
exposed to similar wage increases, which makes it
easy to shift them on to prices. If the competition
effect due to loss of market power outweighs the
reduction in the internalisation of negative external-
ities,enterprise bargaining leads to lower wage levels
than sectoral bargaining. In that case, there is a
hump-shaped relationship between, on the one
hand, the degree of co-ordination of collective bar-
gaining and, on the other hand, the levels of real
wages and unemployment (curve II in Figure 3.2).7
The height of the hump depends on the extent of
competition from abroad. Because sectoral bargain-
ing only reduces competitive pressures from other
domestic producers, the hump will be less pro-
nounced the larger is the degree of competition from
abroad (Danthine and Hunt 1994; Calmfors et al.
2001).
Notes:
a) The table shows how the unemployment rates under intermediate and high co-ordination/centralisation differ from that under
decentralisation/low co-ordination when other factors are controlled for. High co-ordination can be interpreted as
bargaining/co-ordination at the national level, intermediate co-ordination as bargaining/co-ordination at the sectoral level and
low co-ordination/decentralisation as uncoordinated bargaining at the enterprise level.
b) Measures of centralisation capture the level at which actual bargaining takes place. Measures of co-ordination try to capture
informal co-ordination among formally independent bargaining units as well.
c) Equation (5) in Table 4.14. We have classified the countries ranked 1–3 and 7–9 as centralised, the countries ranked 13–17 as
intermediately centralised and the countries ranked 4–6 and 10–12 as decentralised.
d) Equation (4) in Table 5. Bleaney distinguishes between highly centralised systems, highly decentralised systems, moderately
centralised systems with a high degree of corporatism and moderately centralised systems with a low degree of corporatism. In
the table, the last two categories have been amalgamated to one.
e) Equation (8) in Table 1. The entry for intermediate centralisation refers to the country ranked 14 and the entry for co-
ordination to the country ranked 1. The comparison is with the country ranked 17.
f) Equation (2) in Table 2.
g) Equation (4) in Table 2.
h) Equation (4) in Table 4. In the equation, taxes and bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The effects are evaluated at the
average tax ratio for the sample period 1983–95.
i)Equation 4.5 in Table 4.2. In the regression, centralisation is interacted with central bank independence. The effect in the table
is evaluated at the sample average for the central bank independence variable. At high levels of central bank independence
the hump-shaped relationship between centralisation and unemployment turns into a positive (!) monotonic one (that is
with higher centralisation being associated with higher unemployment).
j) Equation (5) in Table 9. In the equation, taxes and bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The effects are evaluated at the
average tax ratio for 1983–95.
k) This study associates the Scandinavian countries with high co-ordination, the European continental countries with
intermediate co-ordination, and the Anglo-Saxon countries with low co-ordination/decentralisation.
l) The dependent variable is non-employment and not unemployment. The study has not been included when computing the
averages.
m) Equation (3) in Table 4.14. The countries ranked 1–5 are classified as highly co-ordinated, the countries ranked 6–10 as
intermediately co-ordinated, and the countries ranked 11–17 as uncoordinated/decentralised.
n) Equation (2) in Table 1.
o) Equation (1) in Table 5.
p) Equation (1) in Table 2.
q) Decade equation in Table 2. Countries have been assigned co-ordination values from 0 (lowest co-ordination) to 1 (highest co-
ordination). In our calculation, high co-ordination is 0.875, intermediate co-ordination is 0.5, and low co-ordination 0.125. In the
regression the co-ordination variable is interacted with a central bank independence variable ranging from 0 to 1. In the
calculation in the table the central bank independence variable has been assigned the value 0.5.
r) Full model in Table 2. High co-ordination refers to the average score for the three countries with the highest co-ordination,
low co-ordination to the three countries with the lowest co-ordination, and intermediate co-ordination to the halfway distance
between the two groups. In the regression the co-ordination variable is interacted with a central bank independence variable
ranging from 0 to 1. In the calculation in the table the central bank independence variable has been assigned the value 0.5. Note
that the monotonic relationship does not hold at high degrees of central bank independence. Then the relationship is instead
u-shaped.
s) The equation explains the log of the unemployment rate. In the calculation of the effect on the unemployment rate, it has been
assumed that unemployment under decentralisation is equal to the average rate of unemployment among the countries studied
during the estimation period.
t) Equation (1) in Table 1. In the equation, macroeconomic shocks and bargaining co-ordination are interacted. The entries show
the differences in the increase of unemployment between the 1960–65 period and the post-1995 period.
u) Equation (1) in Table 3a. The equation has been estimated without fixed country and time effects. With such effects, there are
no significant unemployment differences among various bargaining regimes as indicated by the zeros in the parentheses.
v) Equation(2) in Table 3b. This equation interacts various labour market institutions with each other (for example employment
protection and co-ordination as well as union density and co-ordination). The effects in the table are evaluated at the average
values of employment protection and union density in 1960–94. The equation has been estimated with fixed country and time
effects.
x) Equation(1) in Table 5. This equation interacts various institutional variables with each other (for example union density and
co-ordination as well as the employment tax rate and co-ordination); the effects in the table are evaluated at the average sample
values of union density and tax rates. The effects in the table are steady-state effects.
Source: Calculations by the EEAG.
7This hypothesis was originally formulated by Calmfors and Driffill
(1988). Note that the hump-shaped relationship presupposes that
the degree of bargaining co-ordination is changed along the dimen-
sion firm-sector-nation. Changes in the degree of co-ordination
along the dimension of various types of labour would have other
effects. For example, decentralising collective bargaining so that
different types of labour in each firm negotiate separately would
raise the aggregate wage level if a wage increase for one group
reduces labour demand for other groups (that is, if the various
types of labour are complements in labour demand),since this neg-
ative externality cannot then be taken into account.The empirical research on the determination of
aggregate unemployment in Table 3.3 does not give
a clear verdict on how collective bargaining at the
enterprise level compares with sectoral bargaining.
Almost half the studies indicate that decentralisation
to the enterprise level results in lower unemploy-
ment than sectoral bargaining, whereas the other
half gives the reverse result.As can be seen, there is
a tendency in the studies to find more support for the
hump-shape hypothesis with “centralisation mea-
sures”, focusing on the actual level of bargaining,
than with “co-ordination mea-
sures”, attempting to capture
also informal co-ordination
among separate bargaining
units. But the studies finding a
hump-shaped relationship also
agree that bargaining under high
centralisation/co-ordination (at
the multi-sector or national
level) is associated with lower
unemployment than bargaining
under decentralisation/low co-
ordination (at the enterprise
level).
There is,however,a consensus in
the empirical literature that less
importance of collective bar-
gaining and unions per se – given
the degree of co-ordination of
the collective bargaining that
takes place – is associated with
lower wages or factors likely to
be correlated with lower wages.
Table 3.4 reports estimates of
the effects on unemployment
from cross-section and panel
data sets of countries. There is
also a large body of microeco-
nomic evidence indicating that
higher unionisation and cover-
age of collective agreements
lead to higher wages and lower
profitability of firms (see, for
example, Addison and Hirsch
1989,Belman et al.1997,Kleiner
2001 or Askildsen and Nilsen
2002). This is, of course, to be
expected, since the main raison
d’être of trade unions is to push
up wages and various employee
benefits above the levels that
would otherwise prevail.
An important conclusion is that the chances that
decentralisation of collective bargaining is associ-
ated with wage restraint increase if such a develop-
ment is associated with a reduction in unionisation
and the coverage of collective agreements.This is all
the more so, as there is some evidence that low
unionisation has a larger unemployment-reducing
effect under decentralised bargaining than under
intermediate or high centralisation/co-ordination:





Unemployment rates under various rates of union density and coverage of
collective agreements (ceteris– paribus differences to 15% union density or
coverage) in different studies
a)
Study 45% 75% Explanatory variable
1 Layard et al. (1991) 2.5 4.9 Coverage
2 Scarpetta (1996)
b) 1.8 3.6 Union density
3 Elmeskov et al. (1998) 0 0 Union density
4 Hall & Franzese (1998) 0 0 Union density
5 Iversen (1998) 0 0 Union density












7 Nickell & Layard (1999)
e) 2.4 4.8 Union density
8 Nicoletti et al. (2001)
e) 2.1 4.2 Union density
9 Belot & van Ours (2001)
f) 1.8 (0) 3.6 (0) Union density
10 Belot & van Ours (2001)
g) 4.7 9.4 Union density
11 Nickell et al. (2003)
h) 0 (2.1) 0 (4.2) Union density
Notes:
 a) The table shows how much higher the unemployment rate is at 45% and 75% density
or coverage rates compared to 15% density or coverage rates when other factors are
controlled for.
b) Equation (2) in Table 2.
c) The equation explains the log of the unemployment rate. In the calculation of the effect
on the unemployment rate, we have assumed that unemployment at 15% density and
coverage rates is equal to the average rate of unemployment among the countries studied
during the estimation period.
d) The sum of coverage/density effects.
e) The dependent variable is non-employment and not unemployment.
f) See footnote (u) to Table 3.
g) Equation (2) in Table 3B. The equation interacts various labour market institutions
with each other (for example union density and co-ordination). The entries in the table
refer to the effects of changes in union density under decentralisation. At higher levels of
co-ordination there are no significant effects.
h) Equation (1) in Table 5. The figures not in parenthesis are long-run effects. The figures
in parenthesis are impact effects. The regression equation interacts union density and co-
ordination. The effects in the table are evaluated at the sample average of co-ordination.
Source: Calculations by the EEAG.EEAG Report 69
Chapter 3
variations in unionisation only affect unemployment
under decentralised bargaining.
EMU and different bargaining structures
An issue that has received much interest in the
recent research literature on bargaining co-ordina-
tion is how monetary unification in Europe affects
wage outcomes.
One strand of literature has focused on the interac-
tion between the central bank and wage setters in an
economy with monetary policy autonomy, that is a
flexible-exchange rate economy outside the EMU
(Coricelli et al. 2000, Soskice and Iversen 2000).The
starting point is that,provided there is some co-ordi-
nation of collective bargaining,wage setters could be
expected to act strategically and take into account
the anticipated responses of the central bank to
wage settlements. More precisely, central bank
behaviour can act as a deterrent to high wages,
because wage setters realise that wage increases that
threaten the price stability goal of the central bank
will trigger an interest rate rise that raises the cost of
high wage increases in terms of employment losses
(the effective elasticity of labour demand). For a
country outside EMU, with a flexible exchange rate
and an inflation-targeting central bank,like Sweden,
an extra incentive for wage restraint is thus added
under these conditions. But this incentive does not
work for the EMU countries, as national wage set-
ters will always be too small relative to the ECB to
be able to trigger any monetary policy reaction.
So, one could argue that monetary unification weak-
ens the incentives for wage restraint when there is
some co-ordination of collective bargaining. The
argument has been made that the effect is larger
with only intermediate co-ordination (bargaining at
the sectoral level) than with high co-ordination.The
reason is that in the latter case the incentives for
wage moderation may be very strong anyway
because of various internalisation effects, so the
potential deterrence role of monetary policy may
then not matter much anyway (Soskice and Iversen
2000;Holden 2001).8 But with weaker internalisation
effects in the case of intermediate co-ordination, the
loss of a deterring national monetary policy in EMU
is more serious. This might be one explanation of
why it may be difficult for Germany – with its heavy
reliance on sectoral bargaining – to achieve suffi-
cient real wage moderation (see also Soskice and
Iversen 1998 and Hall and Franzese 1998).
2.2 Aggregate wage flexibility 
Another aspect of pay setting concerns the degree of
aggregate nominal wage flexibility as an adjustment
mechanism in the case of macroeconomic shocks.
This aspect has become more important than before
in the euro zone, as there is no longer any nominal
exchange rate channel for changing real exchange
rates among the member countries.
An old argument already dates back to Keynes
(1936), who argued that the concern of employees
over relative wages would make them oppose money
wage reductions, unless all wages were cut simulta-
neously so as to preserve existing wage relativities.A
more modern version of this co-ordination failure
argument is that because of product demand interre-
lationships, the benefit of changing wages (and thus
also prices) in individual firms depends on whether
or not other firms do the same (Ball and Romer
1991). With small demand shocks, adjustment costs
may make it unprofitable for each firm to change the
wage independently of what happens in other firms.
With very large shocks, it will always pay to adjust
the wage, even if others do not. But for shocks of
intermediate size, the individual wage setter may
gain from adjusting only if others do the same. This
could give rise to multiple equilibria: which one
materialises will then depend on the expectations of
what other wage setters will do.Co-ordination of pay
setting is a way of removing such indeterminacy and
ensuring that the economy ends up in a good equi-
librium in which wages adjust.
A similar argument can be made with respect to the
length of wage contracts, which is an important
determinant of nominal wage flexibility. In systems
with decentralised and unsynchronised wage setting,
contract length may be chosen in a socially ineffi-
cient way (Ball 1987). Most notably, there is an
aggregate-demand externality: wage setters in an
individual bargaining area do not take into account
that a long-term wage contract on their part may
contribute to aggregate demand fluctuations in the
economy. The reason is that money wage stickiness
in a part of the economy means lower flexibility of
the aggregate price level in the case of nominal
8 Iversen (1998) did indeed find empirical support for the hypothe-
sis that a more non-accommodating central bank has a larger
unemployment-reducing effect at intermediate levels of co-ordina-
tion than at high or low levels. But Hall and Franzese (1998) and
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) found only partial empirical support
for the theoretical predictions.shocks. With co-ordination of
wage setting, wage setters have
an incentive to internalise this
externality. This effect works
towards shorter wage contracts
and thus more nominal wage
flexibility, when there is more
co-ordination.9
At the same time, it should be
recognised that decentralised
wage setting is easier to combine
with various systems of perfor-
mance-related pay (see Sec-
tion 2.4), including profit-sharing
arrangements, which increase
aggregate pay flexibility. Also,
lower unionisation and less
importance of collective agree-
ments are likely to make labour markets conform
more closely to the textbook competitive model, with
demand and supply factors exerting a more direct
influence. Overall, however, there has been little
empirical research on the importance of various bar-
gaining systems for nominal wage flexibility.
2.3 Relative wages and wage dispersion
The determination of relative wages is an equally
important aspect of wage setting as the determina-
tion of the aggregate wage level. Aggregate real
wage restraint is not enough for achieving low unem-
ployment if there are large demand and supply
imbalances between regions, sectors, occupations
and skills.
Trade unions typically regard a “fair distribution of
wages” as a central goal. Sometimes the objective is
formulated as “equal pay for equal work”, but many
times the objective is the even more far-reaching one
of general pay compression.This latter objective has
been particularly important in the Scandinavian
countries and Italy.10 Reducing pay compression is a
rational objective for a trade union if the utility gain
for an employer member is seen as larger the lower
is the initial wage.Then a union will be more inclined
to trade off wage increases against employment loss-
es for low-wage than for high-wage members.
Another factor working in the same direction is that
the income loss in case the wage rise makes a mem-
ber unemployed (the wage when employed minus
unemployment compensation) is smaller the lower
the initial wage is (provided that unemployment
compensation is fixed and thus independent of the
wage).
There exists overwhelming evidence that high
degrees of unionisation and coverage of collective
agreements compress the wage structure in all
dimensions.It is also well-known that higher degrees
of centralisation of collective bargaining reduce
wage dispersion (see,for example,Rowthorn 1992 or
Wallerstein 1999). This is illustrated in Figure 3.3,
which shows that earnings dispersion is higher in
New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States, where multi-employer bargaining is rare and
rates of unionisation and coverage of collective
agreements are lower than in other countries.
Reductions in wage dispersion in centralised collec-
tive agreements seem to come about mainly through
higher wages at the lower end of the wage distribu-
tion. For example, Blau and Kahn (1996) found that
centralisation of bargaining reduces wage dispersion
by narrowing the wage differential between the 50th
and 10th percentile, but has no significant effect on
the differential between the 90th and 50th per-
centile. It is also striking how the large increases in
wage dispersion in the United Kingdom over the last




9 But, as analysed by Ball (1987), there is also an externality work-
ing in the opposite direction. It arises because wage setters in an
individual bargaining area will not, under decentralisation, take
into account that an increase in contract length there, and the con-
sequent reduction in nominal wage variability, will reduce real
wage variability in other bargaining areas.
10 For example,the Trade Union Congress in Sweden sees “the pos-
sibility of achieving the basic elements of solidaristic wage policy
with special wage increases for low-wage groups in order to attain
equitable wage differentials” as a main advantage of co-ordinated
bargaining (Riktlinjer för samordnade förhandlingar 2003, 19).EEAG Report 71
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years have coincided in time with de-unionisation,
reduced coverage of collective agreements in gener-
al and virtual disappearance of multi-employer bar-
gaining.
A clear-cut example in Europe of how wage policies
aimed at compressing wage differentials across
regions can contribute to high unemployment is
Germany. As has been reported by the German
Council of Economic Experts (2002), the lowest
union wages in west German industry rose much
more than average wages over the period from 1970
through 1999. This was a direct implication of the
unions’ policy of negotiating for lump sum rather
than proportional wage increases. While the unem-
ployment rates among people with high and average
skills have not risen much in Germany, the unem-
ployment rate of those who have neither vocational
training nor a university degree rose from about 6 to
22 percent in the period from
1975 to 2001.11
The most adverse consequences
of wage compression in
Germany have occurred in east-
ern Germany. Wages per hour
increased from 7 percent of
wages in western Germany in
1989, before unification, to
about 72 percent in 2002 (Sinn
2003). The relative wage per
employee in 2002 amounted to
77 percent, while aggregate pro-
ductivity (GDP per employee)
had only reached a level of
57 percent of the level in western
Germany (see Figure 3.4). This is a major cause of
the high unemployment in eastern Germany (cur-
rently around 18 percent, see Figure 3.5).
2.4 Performance-related pay
During the last two decades, it has been a general
trend in most countries for firms to increasingly use
pay systems to stimulate both individual and group
effort of employees.This trend towards more incen-
tive pay conflicts with traditional union policies of
pay compression,as described in Section 2.3.In most
Western European countries, union policies have
had a large influence on the possibilities of differen-
tiating pay both among and within firms. Sectoral
wage bargaining has limited the possibilities of dif-
ferentiating pay depending on individual company
performance. This has been quite a binding con-
straint, especially in countries like Germany and
Austria, where local bargaining
about the implementation of
sectoral agreements has played
only a limited role.Within firms,
collective agreements tradition-
ally set standard pay rates for
broadly defined groups or tasks
based more on formal criteria
than on individual performance.
An important objective for each
firm is to align the incentives of
the employees with those of the




11 IAB (2002a).requires that this is done in as cost-efficient a way as
possible.One method is close monitoring of employ-
ees combined with threats of dismissal or missed
career opportunities. But monitoring is efficient as
an incentive device only if the probability of discov-
ering “shirking” is high (Nalbantian and Schotter
1997) and may therefore be costly.It will be the more
so the more complex the relationship is between
employee work and firm performance.Performance-
related pay is therefore likely to be part of any opti-
mal incentive package.
The optimal mix of individual pay incentives and
group incentives,such as profit-related pay or employ-
ee stock ownership plans, depends on the character of
production.The advantages for the employer of incen-
tive pay linked to group rather than individual perfor-
mance are greater when (i) capital intensity is high and
the risks of misuse of capital equipment is large;
(ii) when labour inputs are strongly complementary,so
that the pay-off from encouraging co-operation
among employees is high and the potential disruptive
costs from conflicts over the use of differentiated pay
are large; and (iii) when it is difficult to measure indi-
vidual output (which explains why profit sharing and
employee stock ownership plans are common in sec-
tors with complex employee tasks and rapidly chang-
ing technology; Kruse 1996). Another advantage of
profit-related pay is that it introduces more flexibility
of the average pay level in the firm, as discussed in
Section 2.2. One should therefore expect profit shar-
ing to be common in firms with a high variability of
performance and in new firms with uncertain
prospects, which is an empirical prediction that seems
to be borne out by the data (Kruse 1996).
The benefits of incentive pay seem increasingly to
have been realised by employers over the last twen-
ty years. So called Human Resource Management
practices have been adopted by a large number of
firms (Lazear 1999). These practices have been
described as aiming to substitute co-operative
employer-employee relationships, focused on “man-
aging the contribution and commitment of individ-
ual employees”,for more collectivist and adversarial
industrial relations (see, for example, Godard and
Delaney 2000 or Roche 2001). Flexible work assign-
ment,cross training,teamwork and formal employee
participation are typical elements of human resource
management policies.Performance-based pay is also
seen as a key ingredient (see, for example Lazear
1999, Ichniowski et al. 1996, Godard and Delaney
2000 or Rayton 2003).
Not very surprisingly, performance-based pay has
been found to be associated with superior economic
performance in empirical studies. For example, the
profit-sharing literature has found significant links
between firm performance and profit-related pay
(Kruse 1993). A widely quoted study by Ichniowski
et al. (1997) of productivity in steel finishing lines
concluded that “innovative work practices” (incen-
tive pay, team structures and flexible job assign-
ments) lead to higher performance than “traditional
work practices” (narrow job specifications, close
supervision,hourly pay and strict work rules).A very
recent study by Rayton (2003) of US firms finds that
average employee compensation is significantly pos-
itively related to firm performance (in terms of stock
returns and bond ratings) in high-performance firms,
whereas there is no significant relationship between
average employment compensation and perfor-
mance in low-performance firms.
Decentralisation of pay setting to the level of the
individual firm makes it easier in general to design
incentive pay systems that are appropriate for the
specific activities performed.Also average employee
compensation can more easily be linked to firm per-
formance in this way,because benefits in the form of
profit sharing or employee stock ownership plans
can best be traded off against standard wages at the
local level. Indeed, profit sharing arrangements and
employee stock ownership plans have often been
adopted by firms in distress as an explicit part of
concession bargaining at the firm level (see, for
example, Bell and Neumark 1993).12
The standard view has been that unions are
opposed to incentive pay systems because they are
likely to increase wage dispersion. But it has also
been claimed that higher unionisation may not nec-
essarily make such pay systems less likely and that
the key determinant of the probability that such
systems are adopted is the general industrial-rela-
tions climate (Heywood et al. 1998). Interestingly, a
recent study using panel data for US firms found
that, although unionised firms were less likely than
non-unionised firms to have profit sharing and
employee stock ownership plans in 1975, they were
equally likely to have adopted them subsequently




12 There are, however, also many examples of such systems being
adopted because firms want to raise employee compensation in
periods of good performance without taking on an obligation to
pay higher wages also in the future (Kruse 1996).EEAG Report 73
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3. Alternative ways of decentralising pay setting
The development towards more decentralised pay
setting in the current EU countries over the last two
decades, which was described in Section 1.2, has
taken place on the initiative of employers. Several
driving factors have been pointed out:
• Standardised tasks and hierarchical Tayloristic
organisation within firms seem increasingly to
have been replaced by more flexible tasks and
flatter hierarchies, allowing greater decentralisa-
tion of decision-making.This makes an increased
use of performance-related pay systems, which
have to be decided on at the enterprise/workplace
level, profitable for employers (Lindbeck and
Snower 2000; 2001). This development can be
seen as part of a more intensive search for effi-
ciency-enhancing measures at the level of the firm
driven by increased competition (due to product
market deregulations and “globalisation”).
• If most of the competition for a firm comes from
other domestic producers, it may regard uniform
wages across a sector as an advantage because
they provide a “level playing field”. But increas-
ing international competition renders this consid-
eration less relevant. Instead, it becomes more
important for each firm to be able to adjust its
wage level to that of foreign competitors, which
requires greater scope for wage bargaining at the
level of the firm (Crouch 2000a,b; Calmfors et al.
2001).
• A desire to reduce the political power of unions
by limiting their role as a national actor in general
may be a third factor (Elvander 1999;Calmfors et
al. 2001).
The development towards more decentralisation of
pay bargaining can also be seen as an outcome of
“meta bargaining” between unions and employers
about the level at which wage negotiations should
take place.To the extent that the relative bargaining
strength of employers has increased, they may have
been able to shift the locus of bargaining in their pre-
ferred direction. One possible explanation of such a
shift in bargaining power is the increasing degree of
international capital mobility, which gives the
employer side a better “fall-back” position in the
case of disagreement with unions.
Another explanation of the shift in bargaining power
in favour of employers is the fall in unionisation
rates that has taken place in many western European
countries (see Figure 3.1 in Section 1.1). This devel-
opment has been attributed to a number of struc-
tural changes in the economy (Ebbinghaus and
Visser 2000; Calmfors et al. 2001). One such change
is the shift in employment from the traditionally
heavily unionised manufacturing sector to the pri-
vate service sector with many small establishments
that are costly for unions to organise. At the same
time, employment in the public sector, where union-
isation is in most countries higher than in the private
sector (presumably because politicians for election
reasons are more favourable to unions than private-
sector management) has stagnated. Increased rela-
tive importance of part-time and temporary employ-
ment is usually also held as an important explanation
of the trend towards lower unionisation, since
employees on such contracts are likely to see small-
er benefits of being unionised than permanently
employed full-time employees.
The forces behind a decentralisation of pay bargain-
ing are likely to operate also in the future.Thus, one
should expect further decentralisation to occur in
continental, Western European countries. But this
process can take place in different ways, which may
have quite different implications. We shall distin-
guish between three possible scenarios:
1. Massive decentralisation and de-unionisation of
the Anglo-Saxon type
2. Disorganised and gradual decentralisation/de-
unionisation
3. Organised decentralisation where higher-level
collective agreements allow more scope for local
wage setting.
3.1 Massive decentralisation and de-unionisation
The first scenario is massive decentralisation/de-
unionisation of the type that has taken place primar-
ily in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, but
also in Australia.As discussed in Section 1, develop-
ments in these countries have not only meant a large
reduction in unionisation, but also a dramatic reduc-
tion in the coverage of collective agreements and a
radical shift from multi-employer to single-employer
bargaining.
From a theoretical point of view, the Anglo-Saxon
model has its benefits. It allows an increased use of
incentive pay and more relative wage flexibility. As
we discussed in Section 2.1, it is an open question to
which extent collective bargaining at the enterpriselevel in a system with high unionisation and high
coverage of collective agreements creates incentives
for aggregate wage moderation as compared with
higher-level bargaining.But de-unionisation and low
coverage of collective agreements represent strong
wage-moderating forces.
In both the United Kingdom and New Zealand,
there has been much talk of trying to achieve larger
‘individual variation’ in employment contracts. It is,
however, not clear to what extent this has happened
in practice. A weaker role for collective agreements
appears to have led to more legal regulation of ‘min-
imum employment conditions’ (Bray and Walsh
1998; Brown et al. 2000). Employers also often seem
to have stuck to standardised employment contracts
independently of the degree of trade union presence
because of the cost savings implied (Bacon and
Storey 2000).
A development of the Anglo-Saxon type appears
very unlikely in most western European countries in
the near future. Existing bargaining institutions in
these countries seem to be changing only at a slow
pace. One should not expect radical changes in the
bargaining institutions unless there are massive
reforms in the legal regulations. Indeed, it was such
reforms that triggered off the dramatic changes in
pay-setting systems in the United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Australia.
In the United Kingdom, there was a sustained series
of legal changes during the 1980s, which gradually
restricted union powers. These legal reforms
involved: legislation on election of union officials
and secret ballots before strikes; outlawing of sec-
ondary action; making unions liable for fines and
civil damages if legal rules on industrial action were
not observed;de facto abolition of closed shops;legal
recognition of the right not to belong to a union;and
rules making it more difficult for unions to be recog-
nised by employers (Gregory 1998). Even despite
these radical changes, the reduction in the impor-
tance of collective bargaining has been only a grad-
ual process. The main explanation of the decreased
scope of collective bargaining has been the difficul-
ties of unions to get recognition at new workplaces
rather than de-recognition at already existing ones
(Machin 2000).The legal reforms seem to have led to
a situation where traditional union wage premiums
have largely disappeared,and where unionisation no
longer appears to cause negative productivity effects
(Addison and Belfield 2001; Forth et al. 2002).
In New Zealand,the changes in wage-setting institu-
tions were triggered by the Employment Contracts
Act of 1991, which introduced completely new
labour legislation. Here, unlike in the United
Kingdom, no attempts were made to regulate the
internal structure of unions. Instead, the guiding
principle behind the new legislation was to view the
employee and the employer as the primary parties to
the bargaining process. Each employee must choose
between bargaining on his/her own or being repre-
sented by a “bargaining agent”,who could be anoth-
er person or an organisation. A trade union can be
such an organisation,but it cannot bargain on behalf
of an employee (not even a union member) unless
he/she has given it explicit bargaining authority.
Legislation allows explicitly for two types of employ-
ment contracts: individual and collective ones.
Single-employer bargaining is encouraged,for exam-
ple, by explicit provisions prohibiting industrial
action to force an employer to become a party to a
multi-employer collective agreement (Honeybone
1997; Bray and Walsh 1998).
Changes in the legal regulations in Australia have
been later and less radical. But the Workplace
Relations Act of 1997 clearly favours collective
agreements at the enterprise level and restricts the
earlier use of compulsory arbitration (with “wage
awards” now being confined mainly to minimum
wages). The legislation also allows for individual
employment contracts, although, unlike in New
Zealand, these have not become the norm, but
instead require an active “opt-out” (Bray and Walsh
1998).
The upshot is that dramatic changes in wage-setting
systems of the type that have occurred in Anglo-
Saxon countries would seem to require massive legal
interventions, abolishing, for example, legal restric-
tions on individual employment contracts that stipu-
late lower wages or other less favourable employ-
ment conditions than in collective agreements. Such
favourability clauses exist, for example, in Germany,
the Netherlands and France.In the United Kingdom
and New Zealand, the fundamental changes in pay-
setting institutions were made politically possible
because of deep economic crises and widespread dis-
satisfaction with the workings of the traditional sys-
tems. But it is difficult to see that the political pre-
conditions for such radical reforms exist in Western
European countries today. This point is underlined
by the failure to include even very modest changes
of the pay-setting system in the recently adopted
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labour market reforms in Germany. It appears that
political resistance to reforms of pay-setting prac-
tices is often much harder than to other types of
labour market reform. The main reason is that
changes in the pay-setting regime have a large,direct
impact on employed insiders, as discussed in Chap-
ter 2. Also, union officials, who see their role chal-
lenged, have strong incentives to try to organise
political opposition to such reforms.
3.2 Disorganised decentralisation
An alternative scenario is that decentralisation and
de-unionisation proceed in a spontaneous way with-
out legal changes and with opposition from the
union side. Such a disorganised decentralisation
process seems to have been going on in Germany. It
has, to a large extent, been concentrated in eastern
Germany,where many firms have left the employers’
associations in order to conclude enterprise agree-
ments outside the sectoral collective agreements,
and others have, in violation of existing legislation,
paid wages below the minimum levels stipulated in
the sectoral agreements.
In eastern Germany, western German unions and
employers’ organisations stepped in immediately
after unification in 1990 to carry out wage negotia-
tions. Before the privatisation programmes could
begin,long-term wage contracts were concluded that
foresaw full wage equalisation with western Ger-
many in only five years. After privatisation, many
east German entrepreneurs tried to negotiate new
contracts, but they only managed to postpone the
time of wage equalisation by one year. As a conse-
quence, many employers broke the union contracts
with the silent consent of the unions, whereas others
left the employers’ organisations. In 2002, no more
than 20 percent of all firms with 43 percent of the
work force were covered by sectoral agreements in
eastern Germany, whereas the corresponding shares
were 44 percent and 63 percent,respectively,in west-
ern Germany (see Table 3.5).
Unions in eastern Germany have been much weak-
ened by this development. When the metalworkers’
union (IG Metall) called for a strike in the spring of
2003 to reduce the working week in eastern
Germany to 35 hours, the weakness of unions there
was clearly exposed. The strike was unpopular
among employees who feared that the union
demands would further undermine the competitive-
ness of their companies.After only a few weeks, the
union had to give in without having achieved any of
its goals.
Spontaneous and disorganised decentralisation has
also occurred in the public sector in Germany. The
earlier joint bargaining association (“Tarifgemein-
schaft”) for public sector employers, encompassing
the federal government,the states and the municipal
employers, collapsed in 2003 because bargaining
goals turned out to be too diverse.To a large extent,
this was related to tensions between western and
eastern states (Eironline Germany 2003a).13
However, one would expect spontaneous decentrali-
sation and de-unionisation processes to be slow,
unless they occur in such extreme economic situa-
tions as in eastern Germany. As pointed out in
Section 3.1,it does appear that,in the absence of fun-
damental changes in the legal framework,bargaining
institutions are very persistent.
A possible explanation is that
the design of labour market
institutions to a large extent
reflects deep-rooted social atti-
tudes. For example, Black (2001)
finds that differences in the
degree of centralisation of wage
bargaining among countries
depends on differences in soci-
etal values relating to such basic
factors as “power distance” (the
Table 3.5
The coverage of collective agreements in eastern and western Germany, 2002






















32 42 14 22
Note: “Orientation” towards sectoral collective agreement means that
firms/workers are not formally encompassed by such agreements, but that wage
conditions have been “influenced” by them.
Source: WSI Tarifarchiv 2003: Tarifbindung (IAB Betriebspanel).
13 Similarly, in Austria, the earlier central-
isation of the (informal) bargaining in the
public sector was abandoned in 2002
because of diversity in bargaining objec-
tives (Eironline Austria 2002). Similar
developments occurred much earlier in
Sweden.degree of inequality of power in organisations and
institutions that the population considers normal),
general attitudes towards “individualisation”, the
cultural values attached to “masculinity” and atti-
tudes towards risk.
Another factor that counteracts tendencies toward
spontaneous moves to single-employer bargaining is
the demand for insurance on the part of employers
against the costs of labour market conflicts. An
important function of employers’ associations in
some countries, such as the Scandinavian ones and
Germany, is to provide this type of insurance
through joint conflict funds. Indeed, in Sweden, for
example, multi-employer bargaining initially
emerged on the initiative of employers who sought
to protect themselves against union action against
individual firms through such co-operation (Skogh
1984). The operation of such a system of insurance
creates incentives for hierarchical control in the
employers’ associations to address moral hazard
problems, so that individual employers do not
choose too aggressive a stand against unions leading
to an excessive number of labour market conflicts.
Spontaneous moves to single-employer bargaining
are not likely to proceed at a fast pace in most west-
ern European countries. Nor are unionisation and
the coverage of collective agreements likely to fall
rapidly.The structural changes working in this direc-
tion, which we discussed in the introduction to
Section 3, occur only slowly over time, and trade
unions may, to some extent, develop strategies to
cope with them (Calmfors et al. 2001). Experiences
from the United States and Canada seem also to
imply that negative management attitudes to union-
isation may matter much less for union recognition
and the existence of collective agreements than the
legal framework (Kleiner 2001).
The available empirical research surveyed in Sec-
tion 2.1 does not permit clear-cut conclusions on the
macroeconomic effects of moving from a system of
sectoral collective bargaining,such as in Germany,to
a system of collective bargaining at the enterprise
level.If the hump-shape hypothesis (see Section 2.1)
is correct, such decentralisation will promote aggre-
gate real wage restraint,although the effects may not
be very large.But there is also the possibility that the
incentives for wage restraint are weakened.This risk
is most apparent if a move to single-employer bar-
gaining would occur at the same time as coverage of
collective agreements and unionisation remain fairly
high.
3.3 Organised decentralisation
A third possibility is organised decentralisation (a
term coined by Traxler 1995), according to which
higher-level union confederations and employers’
associations choose voluntarily to leave more scope
for local bargaining. At least theoretically, this sce-
nario would seem to offer the greatest possibilities of
combining the benefits of co-ordination in terms of
internalisation of various effects of wage increases
with the benefits of larger relative-wage flexibility.
Several models exist for such organised decentrali-
sation.
Local determination of the distribution of wage
increases
One possibility is to retain the determination of the
total margin for wage increases (the average wage
increase in each firm/workplace) at the higher (usu-
ally sectoral) level, but increase the freedom of local
bargainers to determine how this margin should be
distributed among the individual employees in the
firm/workplace. In many countries there has been a
general trend towards such separation of the deci-
sions at the sectoral level on the total margin appli-
cable to each firm and the decisions at the enterprise
level on how the agreed wage increase should be dis-
tributed among individuals. But the development
does not seem to have gone very far in countries like
Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy. The develop-
ment has gone much further in the Netherlands and
the Scandinavian countries. In the Netherlands, sec-
tor-wide agreements have been interpreted as
“increasingly adopting the character of framework
agreements, which then need to be developed in
detail at company level” (Eironline Netherlands
2002a).This can occur through negotiations between
the employer and the local works council.
Table 3.6 gives an overview of the differences in the
designs of existing collective agreements in Sweden
in 2002. According to the table, collective agree-
ments with standard wage increases at the sectoral
level that applied to all employees (category 7) exist-
ed only in the private sector and did not encompass
more than ten percent of the employees there. All
other collective agreements left some scope for local
bargaining about the distribution of wage increases
among individual employees. Usually local bargain-
EEAG Report 76
Chapter 3EEAG Report 77
Chapter 3
ing about the distribution of wage increases was con-
ducted under the constraint of a minimum guaran-
teed wage increase for everyone (sometimes only as
a guarantee when the collective agreement was eval-
uated ex post) or a fall-back clause stipulating that
such a guarantee would apply if the local parties
could not agree (categories 3, 5 and 6).
Delegating the decisions on the distribution of wage
increases among individuals to the local level makes
it possible to use pay increases as an individual
incentive mechanism. It is instructive to study how
this has influenced wage setting in hospital care in
Sweden, where employers (the
regional authorities) have tried
(in fact much more consistently
than in large parts of the private
sector) to introduce pay policies
that aim explicitly at stimulating
effort and on-the-job training
(Calmfors and Richardson
2003).This has been achieved for
registered nurses (sjuksköter-
skor in Swedish), where, since
1995, the union side has accept-
ed that the distribution of
nationally agreed pay increases
are a subject for local negotia-
tions only, without any influence
from higher bargaining levels.
Such a pay system has not been
accepted by the trade union
organising less educated assis-
tant nurses (undersköterskor in
Swedish), for whom collective
agreements have contained
guarantees of pay rises for the
individual (more or less amount-
ing to the standard pay increases
negotiated centrally). As can be
seen from Table 3.7, wage dis-
persion has increased substan-
tially for registered nurses (in the upper half of the
wage distribution), whereas it has stayed more or
less constant for assistant nurses.
Local determination of the total margin for wage
increases
Table 3.6 also shows that a substantial share of
employees in Sweden is subject to higher-level,
multi-year agreements that do not specify any fig-
ures for wage increases at all, but leave the determi-
nation of both, the total margin for wage increase
(the average wage increase) and its distribution
Table 3.6
Types of collective agreement in Sweden, 2002









1. Local bargaining without
    nationally determined margin for
    wage increase
73 2 2 8
2. Local bargaining with nationally
    determined margin for wage in-
    crease if the local parties cannot
    agree
5
3. Local bargaining with a nationally
    determined margin for wage in-
    crease if the local parties cannot
    agree and some type of binding
    individual guarantee
86 8
4. Local bargaining on the distri-
    bution of nationally determined
    margin for wage increase without
    any type of individual guarantee
72 4
5. Local bargaining on the distri-
    bution of nationally determined
    margin for wage increase with a
    binding individual guarantee or an
    individual guarantee if the local
    parties cannot agree
45 48
6. Nationally agreed general wage
    increase plus local bargaining on
    the distribution of additional
    nationally determined margin
18
7. Nationally agreed general wage
    increase
7
Note: Local government refers to regional authorities and municipalities.
Source: Avtalsrörelsen och lönebildningen (2002).
Table 3.7
Wage dispersion in Swedish hospital care run by regional authorities
1988 1994 2002
90/10 90/50 50/10 90/10 90/50 50/10 90/10 90/50 50/10
Registered nurses
(sjuksköterskor)
1.18 1.05 1.12 1.19 1.07 1.11 1.29 1.15 1.12
Assistant nurses
(undersköterskor)
1.12 1.02 1.10 1.08 1.03 1.04 1.13 1.06 1.07
Note: 90/10 is the wage ratio between the 90th and the 10th percentiles etc.
Source: Calmfors and Richardson (2003).among individual employees in each firm/workplace,
entirely to annual local bargaining (category 1).Such
contracts apply to seven percent of the employees in
the private sector and to as much as 32 and 28 per-
cent in central government and local government
(municipalities and regional authorities), respec-
tively. These contracts apply mainly to white-collar
employees with higher education. This represents
another form of organised decentralisation, where
higher-level collective agreements delegate also the
determination of “total” wage increases to bargain-
ing at the local level. The local bargaining is then
conducted under a “peace obligation”,ruling out the
use of industrial action.With such delegation of bar-
gaining rights, higher organisational levels retain
some co-ordination capacities through their influ-
ence on local negotiators as well as the capacity to
“recall” the delegation in future collective agree-
ments. This “recall capacity” can be seen as a con-
straint on the behaviour of local parties, at the same
time as the delegation increases the scope for adjust-
ing wage developments to local conditions. So far,
collective agreements leaving the determination of
the total margin for wage increases to the local level
have mainly been used as a means to raise relative
wages for groups with a favourable labour market
position. But such agreements could also allow
downward wage flexibility in situations of unfavour-
able labour market developments.
Local incentive pay schemes
The possibilities of using incentive pay mechanisms
at the level of the individual firm/workplace can be
enhanced by sectoral agreements on the design of
performance-related pay systems. For example, the
Confederation of Danish Industries and the Central
Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark
concluded a framework agreement on a new pay sys-
tem (Plus Pay) in 2002, outlining the general princi-
ples for how basic pay (80 percent of the total wage)
and qualification-motivated supplements should be
combined with task-related bonuses and perfor-
mance-related pay elements, with the specific design
in each firm to be negotiated in local bargaining
(Eironline Denmark 2002). A similar framework
agreement on more decentralised pay was also con-
cluded in the public sector in Denmark in 2002
(Eironline Denmark 2003). Another example is the
2002 agreement in the German banking sector on
variable pay, allowing variations of annual earnings
of up to eight percent) based on performance
appraisals and achievements of agreed targets
(Eironline Germany 2003b).
We are not, however, aware of any sectoral or other
higher-level collective agreements in EU countries
on guiding principles for how local bargaining par-
ties could trade off employee benefits in the form of
profit sharing or employee stock ownership arrange-
ments against standard pay rates in individual firms.
In Finland, for example, unions have tried to negoti-
ate such framework agreements,but employers have
not been willing to do so (Eironline Finland 2003).
On the other hand, unions have often been opposed
to such compensation schemes, because they are
likely to increase pay dispersion. However, in a sys-
tem where the main locus of pay bargaining is the
sectoral level, such framework agreements may be
necessary for a more widespread introduction of
profit-related pay.
Opening clauses
A final possibility of increasing the flexibility of
company pay levels in a system with sectorally nego-
tiated pay increases is to widen the scope also for
downward deviations from them. In Germany, for
example, these possibilities are very restricted. The
so-called favourability principle in the federal
Collective Agreements Act (§ 4) states that “sites
which are subject to collective agreements can only
approve regulations which depart from the collective
agreement if the changes are in the employees’
favour” (Bispinck 2003). Downward adjustments of
the pay level to save jobs are not allowed under this
stipulation, unless an explicit opening clause has
been negotiated in the sectoral agreement. Such
clauses are, however, usually quite restrictive and
allow only limited and temporary deviations from
the sectorally determined pay levels (Lange et al.
2001). A possible reform, proposed, for example, by
the German Council of Economic Experts (2002)
would be to amend the statutory regulations to
establish a legal framework for decentralised pay
bargaining. Each employer and local works council
could be given complete freedom to deviate both
upwards and downwards from the sectoral agree-
ments if they agree on that. Alternatively, such a
deviation could be allowed if a certain proportion of
the employees agree to it. Introducing such “sym-
metric”flexibility at the local level would allow both,
greater wage dispersion among firms in general and
greater possibilities to adjust wages locally to
adverse shocks. One would not, however, expect
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such a reform to radically affect wage outcomes, as
the sectoral wage agreement would serve as a fall-
back option in local bargaining in the case the par-
ties cannot agree. Still, it did not prove possible to
include such limited changes of the pay-setting sys-
tem in the recent labour market reforms in Germany
(see Chapter 2).
4. Conclusions
Each system of pay setting has its advantages and
disadvantages.There is ample research evidence that
highly co-ordinated collective bargaining at the
multi-sector or national level,such as in many small-
er European countries, promotes aggregate real
wage restraint and low unemployment. Controlling
for other factors, unemployment appears to be sys-
tematically lower with high co-ordination of collec-
tive bargaining than with intermediate co-ordination
(where the locus of bargaining is the sectoral level).
There are reasons to believe that EMU membership
could increase the benefits of high co-ordination.
The explanation is that monetary policy in EMU
cannot react to wage hikes in individual countries,
which weakens its disciplining force. Under such cir-
cumstances, there may be a greater pay-off from
wage-setting arrangements that in themselves foster
wage moderation than if national monetary policy
could be used as a direct means to influence domes-
tic wage setting. However, pay compression and
inflexibility of relative wages seem always to be seri-
ous disadvantages of centralised wage bargaining.
Decentralisation of collective bargaining to the level
of the firm facilitates the adjustment of wages to the
labour market situation of different skill categories,
occupations, regions and sectors. Such single-
employer bargaining also facilitates the use of per-
formance-related pay to boost labour effort and pro-
ductivity. It appears, however, that decentralised col-
lective bargaining is less conducive to aggregate real
wage restraint and low unemployment than highly
co-ordinated bargaining. But it is less clear how
decentralised collective bargaining compares with
intermediate centralisation (sectoral bargaining) in
this respect. According to some empirical studies,
decentralised collective bargaining leads, other
things equal, to lower unemployment than sectoral
bargaining. According to others it leads to higher
unemployment. What is clear, however, is that low
unionisation and low coverage of collective agree-
ments promote real wage restraint and high employ-
ment. Therefore, the chances that single-employer
bargaining results in wage moderation increase if a
development in this direction goes hand in hand with
a reduced importance of collective bargaining.
As to the flexibility of the aggregate pay level, there
are conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, an
increased use of profit-related pay under single-
employer collective bargaining can help raise aggre-
gate pay flexibility. But, on the other hand, it can
become more difficult to change wages in response
to macroeconomic disturbances if bargaining is
decentralised and unsynchronised, because the
incentives for wage adjustments for a particular bar-
gaining area may be weak unless other bargaining
areas also adjust their wages.
Against this background, which pay-setting systems
should the EU countries opt for? One cannot give a
generally valid answer to this question.A character-
istic feature of pay-setting systems is their high
degree of inertia: it usually takes a very long time or
very special circumstances to achieve fundamental
changes. So, the answer is likely to depend on the
starting point, which for historical reasons differs a
lot among countries.
Several of the current EU member states, especially
many of the smaller states (for example Belgium,
Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands) have been
able to achieve wage moderation through formal or
informal co-ordination of bargaining at the multi-
sector level, involving peak-level labour market
organisations and sometimes also governments.
Through such social pacts it has often been possible
to establish generally accepted norms for wage
increases, serving as benchmarks for subsequent
negotiations at lower bargaining levels. In countries
where such arrangements have worked,there is little
reason to abandon them now. But there are good
reasons for treating central wage norms only as
indicative, and not binding, in order to give more
room for relative wage changes.The trick is to avoid
such recommendations being regarded as “floors”
for wage increases. It is important to get an under-
standing that a functioning market economy means
that wage increases across firms,sectors,occupations
and regions must deviate from the average, depend-
ing on the situation in the specific labour market.
One way of signalling the need for this could be to
publicise a corridor for wage increases rather than a
single figure when guidelines are formulated.
Alternatively, one might define a “normal” wageincrease, which lies below the desired average, with
the understanding that “above-normal” wage
increases should only be granted in bargaining areas
with labour shortages.
Both in countries with a social-pact tradition and in
countries with more traditional bargaining at the
sectoral level, such as Austria and Germany, one
could also conceive of other reforms within the exist-
ing pay-setting system in order to increase relative
pay flexibility among both firms and individuals.
Such organised decentralisation could encompass
reforms of the following type:
• The distribution among individual employees of
agreed “aggregate” wage increases at higher bar-
gaining levels should be determined at the local
level to a much larger extent than is currently the
case. Higher-level agreements should therefore
by and large abstain from providing individual
guarantees of wage increases.
• The scope for opening clauses that give local
wage bargainers also the right to deviate down-
wards from higher-level collective agreements
should be increased. Such flexibility would, for
example, be very helpful for adjusting wages in
eastern Germany and southern Italy to the pre-
vailing unemployment situations.
• Where there is bargaining at the sectoral level,
framework agreements would facilitate the intro-
duction of variable performance-related pay sys-
tems at the level of the individual firm. Such
framework agreements should allow the possibil-
ity of wage adjustments at the company level in
connection with the introduction of profit-sharing
systems or employee stock ownership plans.
• One could also conceive of higher-level collective
agreements that delegate the determination of
the total margin for wage increases (the average
wage increase in each firm/workplace) to the
local level, but where the local negotiations are
conducted under a “peace obligation”, ruling out
industrial action, and the higher level retains the
organisational capacity to “recall” the delegation
in future collective agreements. Such “discre-
tionary delegation” increases the flexibility of
relative wages at the same time as the higher-level
collective agreements serve as a “stand-by
option” if co-ordinated wage adjustments are
needed in a macroeconomic crisis.
How should one expect wage bargaining systems in
continental Western European countries to develop?
We have surveyed the tendencies to decentralisation
that have taken place and concluded that this devel-
opment is likely to continue. How should one evalu-
ate this? Obviously, the conclusion depends on the
starting point from which decentralisation occurs.
For the countries with social pact co-ordination, the
key question is whether or not it is possible to have
both general wage norms determined in a co-ordi-
nated way and relative wage changes that are decid-
ed in a decentralised manner. In our view the jury is
still out.An optimistic scenario is that the process of
organised decentralisation proceeds in the manner
we have described so as to make greater diversity of
wages compatible with continued aggregate real
wage moderation. A pessimistic scenario is that dis-
organised decentralisation,increasing the number of
independent pay-setting actors,ultimately makes co-
ordinated wage restraint unfeasible.
For a country such as Germany, where the main
locus of collective bargaining is the sectoral level and
the extent of co-ordination of collective bargaining is
lower than in many of the smaller EU countries, the
prospects are different.It is possible that a disorgan-
ised decentralisation process could lead to more
aggregate wage restraint. But the difference to cur-
rent outcomes may be small. And it is also possible
that more single-employer collective bargaining
could weaken the incentives for such wage restraint.
A key requirement for overcoming the present stag-
nation in Germany seems to be that labour market
reforms are extended to pay-setting practices in such
a way that greater diversity of wages is allowed.
If it turns out to be impossible to combine aggregate
real wage restraint with relative-wage flexibility in
the continental western European economies, one
could not in the long term rule out an Anglo-Saxon
development, where decentralisation of collective
bargaining is accompanied by massive de-unionisa-
tion and reduction in coverage of collective agree-
ments.But such a development would probably only
occur as the consequence of radical political reform
of basic labour legislation after a deep economic cri-
sis. An important reason why this scenario may not
materialise is that trade unions may find it in their
self-interest to acquiesce in both wage restraint and
organised decentralisation precisely because they
want to avoid such a development.
Most of the new EU member states in Eastern and
Central Europe find themselves in an entirely differ-
EEAG Report 80
Chapter 3EEAG Report 81
Chapter 3
ent situation from the present EU states in Western
Europe. Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Latvia,Lithuania and Poland are all characterised by
decentralised pay bargaining at the level of the
enterprise and low unionisation and coverage of col-
lective agreements.These countries are likely to face
strong pressures from Western European trade
unions, and possibly also from EU institutions, to
change their industrial relations systems so as to con-
form better to “EU standards”. Such pressures
should be resisted.The existing “Anglo-Saxon” com-
bination of enterprise-level bargaining and limited
importance of collective agreements in these coun-
tries is likely to produce better macroeconomic out-
comes than a move to collective bargaining at the
sectoral level of the Western European type.
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